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Abstract—In this work we show that the Internet Control
Message Protocol (ICMP) can be used as an attack vector
against IPsec gateways. The main contribution of this work
is to demonstrate that an attacker having eavesdropping and
traffic injection capabilities in the black untrusted network
(he only sees ciphered packets), can force a gateway to reduce
the Path MTU of an IPsec tunnel to a minimum, which in
turn creates serious issues for devices on the trusted network
behind this gateway: depending on the Path MTU discovery
algorithm, it either prevents any new TCP connection (Denial
of Service), or it creates major performance penalties (more
than 6 seconds of delay in TCP connection establishment
and ridiculously small TCP segment sizes). After detailing the
attack and the behavior of the various nodes, we discuss some
counter measures, with the goal to find a balance between ICMP
benefits and the associated risks.
I. INTRODUCTION
IPsec/ESP [1][2] offer a convenient secure tunnelling
capability that is largely used to interconnect remote sites, or
a remote host to its home network, throughout an unsecured
interconnection network (e.g. Internet). The various hosts
can then exchange confidential information securely, even
in presence of a powerful attacker on the Internet.
IPsec naturally has to interact with every protocol of
the IP suite, and in particular the Internet Control Message
Protocol (ICMP). The goal of ICMP is to exchange control
and error messages, like packet processing error notifica-
tions. ICMP is also involved in several functionalities, and
in particular the Path Maximum Transmission Unit discovery
(PMTUd) mechanism [3], [4], [5] whose goal is to find
the maximum packet size on a path that avoids packet
fragmentation. Such a mechanism is therefore essential for
performance aspects: if a packet is too large, its fragmenta-
tion and reassembly will negatively impact performance; at
the other extreme, if a packet is too small, significantly lower
than the maximum size permitted throughout the path, it will
also negatively impact performance. Assessing the correct
packet size on a network path is therefore a key aspect. But
ICMP is also known to be a cause of attacks, and therefore
there is an incentive for a network administrator to filter
these packets. A balance is therefore required between these
contradictory objectives and it is recognized that a subset of
ICMP packets should be considered by IPsec gateways.
The problem this work addresses is the following: how
can an attacker located in the unsecured interconnection
network exploit the combination of IPsec and ICMP to
mount Denial of Service (DoS) attacks? Note that we do not
consider traditional trivial ICMP attacks (see section VI) in
this work. Our contributions are the following:
• we demonstrate, through a real exploit on a testbed
running a recent Debian distribution, that an external
attacker having eavesdropping and traffic injection
capabilities in the black untrusted network, without
any access to clear-text (he only sees ciphered pack-
ets), can either stall TCP connections going through
the IPsec tunnel, or create major performance
penalties;
• we explain how IPsec and ICMP interact with one
another, in presence of either the PMTUd or the
PLPMTUd algorithms;
• we provide some ideas on how to thwart this attack,
in particular a novel way of using PLPMTUd within
IPsec gateways;
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section II we introduce the network and the attacker model.
IPsec and ICMP are described in Section III. Section IV
describes in detail our attack. Section V presents the counter-
measures we propose. We position our paper and present
related work in Section VI. Finally we conclude.
II. NETWORK AND ATTACKER
A. The network model
Fig. 1: Network model showing the site-to-site (top) and
device-to-site (bottom) configurations.
Our network model identifies two zones: the trusted
areas, consisting of networks and devices behind IPsec
gateways, also called ”red networks”, and the outer world
considered as untrusted, and also called ”black network”.
Trusted areas can be interconnected by IPsec gateways
through IPsec tunnels (site-to-site configuration of Fig. 1).
Moreover, an isolated device can establish an IPsec tunnel
if it includes the IPsec gateway functionalities (device-to-
site configuration of Fig. 1).
The role of the IPsec gateway is to secure the traffic
between remote trusted networks and/or devices by en-
crypting packets sent over the untrusted black network.
Being part of the trusted areas, the IPsec gateways are
not considered malicious. Nevertheless, these gateways are
directly connected to the untrusted network, making them
the first line of defense against untrusted traffic.
B. The attacker model
Because of the network model, we assume that no
attacker is located inside a trusted red network, all the attacks
are conducted by adversaries from the the external black
network. Therefore an attacker only sees encrypted traffic
and has no way to decrypt packets. We also assume the
attacker can eavesdrop the traffic and inject forged packets.
However the attacker cannot decrypt a ciphered packet nor
encrypt its own packet since the underlying cryptographic
building blocks and the key exchange protocols are con-
sidered secured. Such an attacker can be a compromised
router along the path followed by an IPsec tunnel, in the
black network, or a station attached to a non-secured Wi-Fi
network, when users of this Wi-Fi network connect to their
home network through a VPN.
The goal of the attacker is to launch a DoS against
the secure tunnel service provided by IPsec gateways.
For instance he wants to significantly reduce the througput
achieved by IPsec tunnels, and if possible, to prevent con-
nections between devices located in different red networks.
III. IPSEC AND ICMP IN A NUTSHELL
In this section we give some background on IPsec [1],
ICMP [7], and the two standardized algorithms to discover
the maximum packet size along a path. Then we discuss
standard recommendations for ICMP processing policies
within IPsec.
A. IPsec overview
IPsec has two core protocols, AH [8] and ESP [2],
and two modes of operation, transport and tunnel. In our
work we consider the traditional solution: IPsec/ESP in
tunnel mode. In that case IPsec/ESP provide confidential-
ity, authentication, integrity and anti-replay services. More
precisely, the initial IP header and data of an incoming
packet (called inner IP packet) arriving at the IPsec tunnel
endpoint are ciphered by ESP and then tunneled in a new
IP header (called outer IP packet). Upon leaving the other
tunnel endpoint, the opposite operations take place.
IPsec requires three major databases: the Secu-
rity Policy Database (SPD), the Security Association
Database (SAD) and the Peer Authorization Database
(PAD). Throughout the paper, we only focus on the SAD
since it stores important information about active tunnels,
like ciphering keys (that are initialized by the IKEv2 [9]
protocol), or the PMTU (see section III-B1) for this tunnel,
which plays a key role in our attack. Each entry in this
SAD is identified by a Security Parameters Index (SPI), that
is copied in clear in the outer IP packet header.
B. ICMP overview
ICMP handles both error and informational mes-
sages [10]. Error messages can be any of the following:
destination unreachable, source quench, redirect, time ex-
ceeded and parameter problem. Informational messages are
other control signalizations: echo request/reply, router solic-
itation/advertisement, timestamp request/reply, information
request/reply and address mask request/reply.
In particular, ICMP is heavily used in the Path MTU
discovery (PMTUd) algorithm [3]. PMTUd is a key mecha-
nism for the network performance since it enables a sender
to determine the appropriate packet size, dynamically. Since
many packet processing overheads remain the same regard-
less of the packet size, reducing their number is critical from
a performance point of view, and this is what a well-chosen
PMTU enables [11], [12], [13].
1) The legacy PMTUd mechanism: Let us illustrate the
behavior of PMTUd in an IPv4 (resp. IPv6) network.
A sender sets the Don’t Fragment (DF) bit in a packet1.
If a router cannot transmit this packet because of its
size, it must send back to the sender an ICMP ”Destina-
tion unreachable”/”Fragmentation needed” packet (resp. an
ICMPv6 ”Packet Too Big”/”Fragmentation needed”), along
with the next hop MTU information. In the following we
will call these error messages ICMP PTB (Packet Too Big),
independently of whether IPv4 or IPv6 is used.
Iteratively, upon receiving such ICMP PTB packet, the
sender decreases the packet size until it reaches the lowest
MTU on the path to the destination. Since this path can
change dynamically (because of re-routing), this process
needs to be performed periodically.
Although efficient, the PMTUd approach suffers from
several limits, mainly because ICMP packets are often
filtered by some routers/firewalls [14] along their route to
the sender. In that case the sender has no way to discover
and resolve the problem.
2) The Packetization Layer PMTUd mechanism: To
overcome these issues, the IETF developed a new Path
MTU discover mechanism that does not rely on ICMP, the
Packetization Layer PMTUd (PLPMTUd) [15]. Instead of
using ICMP, it relies on a packetization layer protocol with
an acknowledgement mechanism, such as TCP. Using this
protocol, PLPMTUd sends probing packets of an appropriate
size to the destination in order to assess the MTU along
the path. Upon receiving an acknowledgement for a probing
packet, the sender validates that the PMTU is at least equal
to the probing packet size, while a time-out is used to infer
that the PMTU is smaller than the size probed. With TCP,
any TCP data segment can be used as a probing packet if
enough data is available to fill in the payload. Here also the
PLPMTUd process needs to be performed periodically.
C. ICMP processing in IPsec
IPsec specifies dedicated rules to process ICMP packets
and administrators need to decide, through configuration,
1This is useless in IPv6 since fragmentation is not supported any more.
how to handle some of them. More precisely, a distinction
is made between error and informational ICMP packets, and
the network area they come from ([1] Sections 5 and 8).
The recommended treatments are summarized in TABLE I.
The key row of this table for our attack, is the last one
that corresponds to untrusted ICMP error messages. If the
policy is left open, there are strong incentives to consider
the particular case of ICMP PTB error messages in order to
enable PMTU discovery [1].
ICMP type origin recommended treatment
info. message trusted administrator’s policy
info. message untrusted administrator’s policy
error message trusted check packet, process if okay
error message untrusted administrator’s policy
TABLE I: Recommended ICMP processing rules in IPsec.
a) Minimum sanity check for untrusted ICMP error
messages: when an administrator allows the processing of
ICMP error messages coming from the untrusted network
and triggered by a packet sent in an active IPsec tunnel
(e.g. with the PMTUd mechanism), the following sanity
check is performed ([16], section 2.3). ICMP specifies that a
router generating such an error message must include in the
ICMP packet payload the beginning of the (ciphered) packet
that triggered the error. Upon receiving the error message,
the IPsec protocol must verify that the outer header of the
triggering packet (contained in the ICMP payload) maps to
a valid entry in the SAD by checking the source/destination
IP addresses and SPI. If not, the ICMP packet must be
immediately discarded.
b) Additional sanity checks: in addition to the mini-
mum sanity check, some IPsec implementations (including
the one we considered, see section IV) decrypt the ICMP
packet payload, recover the inner IP packet header and
verify that the source/destination IP addresses of the inner
packet match the SAD entry associated to the SPI. If the
check fails, the message is immediately dropped.
This is an easy solution to avoid blind attacks, coming
from attackers that are not able to eavesdrop an active tunnel,
but of course it offers no protection if the attacker is on the
path followed by the IPsec tunnel.
[1] also recommends to ”establish a minimum PMTU for
traffic (on a per destination basis), to prevent receipt of an
unauthenticated ICMP from setting the PMTU to a trivial
size”. We will see in our attack that this is not necessarily
sufficient.
IV. USING ICMP AS ATTACK VECTOR AGAINST IPSEC
A. Experimental conditions
Our attack is designed to take place in site-to-site or
device-to-site configurations that involve at least one IPsec
gateway (Fig 1). The attack is carried out from the untrusted
network, and through the IPsec gateway, targets devices in
the trusted network, behind the gateway. The attacker model
is the one described in section II-B, i.e. the attacker can
eavesdrop and inject traffic on the untrusted network.
We illustrate the attack by considering an on-the-shelf
IPsec gateway with its default configuration2. The gate-
ways as well as the end machines are all running the stable
”Squeeze” Debian distribution [17], with Linux kernel 3.2.1
[18]. However this attack is not specific to this distribution.
We exhibit the impact of the attack on a user, in a trusted
red network, that tries to establish an ssh connection with
a machine located on a remote trusted red network, through
the IPsec tunnel, using IPv43.
In the following attack description, we first assume that
devices rely on the classic PMTUd algorithm (default) and
show that it leads to a DoS since the attacker can easily
prevent any new ssh connection from being established.
Then, in section IV-C, we consider the case where
devices rely on the PLPMTUd alternative and show that the
attacker can slow down the ssh connection (6+ seconds of
initial delay) as well as limiting the TCP segment size to
a tiny value much lower than the minimum MTU size of
IPv4.
Finally, we give a quick report on the attack on a bulk
UDP flow. Here also, the attack leads to a major slow down
of the connection since the gateway needs to further segment
IP datagrams.
B. DoS on TCP connections with devices using PMTUd
Let us assume that end-devices use PMTUd. The attack
is illustrated in Fig. 2 and the corresponding tcpdump
traces, collected on the red network, are shown in Fig. 3.
Note that the traces show the two flows of TCP (connec-
tions are bidirectional), whereas Fig. 2 is simplified and
only shows the flow being attacked. In particular the ssh
connection establishment involves the exchange of 784 bytes
in one direction (which hit the gateway PMTU entry) and
848 bytes in the other direction (this segment is not subject
to PMTU restrictions).
Fig. 2: Our attack on an IPsec gateway, PMTUd case
2Since we assume that most administrators do not change the default
IPsec policies with regard to ICMP processing, we did not change them.
3In this configuration, the attacker targets the ssh server’s gateway. We
also tested with the symmetric configuration, where the attacker targets the
ssh client’s gateway. Since the results are exactly the same, they are not
shown here.
0.000000 a.b.10.7.48058 > a.b.11.5.ssh: S *:*(0) win 17920 <mss 8960,sackOK,timestamp 1245892 0,nop,wscale 7> (DF)
0.000146 a.b.11.5.ssh > a.b.10.7.48058: S *:*(0) ack * win 17896 <mss 8960,sackOK,timestamp 1319280 1245892,nop,wscale 7> (DF)
0.000304 a.b.10.7.48058 > a.b.11.5.ssh: . ack 1 win 140 <nop,nop,timestamp 1245892 1319280> (DF)
0.004561 a.b.11.5.ssh > a.b.10.7.48058: P 1:33(32) ack 1 win 140 <nop,nop,timestamp 1319281 1245892> (DF)
0.004698 a.b.10.7.48058 > a.b.11.5.ssh: . ack 33 win 140 <nop,nop,timestamp 1245893 1319281> (DF)
0.004773 a.b.10.7.48058 > a.b.11.5.ssh: P 1:33(32) ack 33 win 140 <nop,nop,timestamp 1245893 1319281> (DF)
0.004858 a.b.11.5.ssh > a.b.10.7.48058: . ack 33 win 140 <nop,nop,timestamp 1319281 1245893> (DF)
0.004933 a.b.11.5.ssh > a.b.10.7.48058: P 33:817(784) ack 33 win 140 <nop,nop,timestamp 1319281 1245893> (DF)
0.004953 a.b.11.4 > a.b.11.5: ICMP ERROR: a.b.10.7 unreachable - need to frag (mtu 514) [tos 0xc0]
0.004998 a.b.10.7.48058 > a.b.11.5.ssh: P 33:881(848) ack 33 win 140 <nop,nop,timestamp 1245893 1319281> (DF)
0.005084 a.b.11.5.ssh > a.b.10.7.48058: . 33:533(500) ack 33 win 140 <nop,nop,timestamp 1319281 1245893> (DF)
0.005092 a.b.11.4 > a.b.11.5: ICMP ERROR: a.b.10.7 unreachable - need to frag (mtu 514) [tos 0xc0]
0.005095 a.b.11.5.ssh > a.b.10.7.48058: P 533:817(284) ack 33 win 140 <nop,nop,timestamp 1319281 1245893> (DF)
0.005228 a.b.10.7.48058 > a.b.11.5.ssh: . ack 33 win 140 <nop,nop,timestamp 1245893 1319281,nop,nop,sack 1 {533:817} > (DF)
0.043580 a.b.11.5.ssh > a.b.10.7.48058: . ack 881 win 154 <nop,nop,timestamp 1319291 1245893> (DF)
0.215586 a.b.11.5.ssh > a.b.10.7.48058: . 33:533(500) ack 881 win 154 <nop,nop,timestamp 1319334 1245893> (DF)
0.215594 a.b.11.4 > a.b.11.5: ICMP ERROR: a.b.10.7 unreachable - need to frag (mtu 514) [tos 0xc0]
0.639580 a.b.11.5.ssh > a.b.10.7.48058: . 33:533(500) ack 881 win 154 <nop,nop,timestamp 1319440 1245893> (DF)
0.639586 a.b.11.4 > a.b.11.5: ICMP ERROR: a.b.10.7 unreachable - need to frag (mtu 514) [tos 0xc0]
Fig. 3: tcpdump trace on the red network during the attack, PMTUd case. Here the remote client machine with IP address
a.b.10.7 tries to ssh to the local machine with IP address a.b.11.5, located behind the IPsec gateway with IP address a.b.11.4.
(NB: non required information has been removed from these traces)
1) Forging an ICMP PTB packet from the untrusted net-
work: the attack requires the attacker to forge an appropriate
ICMP PTB packet (a single packet is sufficient). This is done
by first eavesdropping a valid packet from the IPsec tunnel
on the untrusted network. Then the attacker forges an ICMP
PTB packet (1 in Fig. 2), specifying a very small MTU value
equal or smaller than 576 with IPv4 (resp. 1280 with IPv6).
This packet spoofs the IP address of a router of the untrusted
network (in case the source IP address is checked), and in
order to bypass the IPsec protection mechanism against
blind attacks, it includes as a payload a part of the outer IP
packet that has just been eavesdropped.
Note that this is the only packet an attacker needs to
generate. The following steps do not involve any action from
the attacker.
2) Reset of the PMTU on the gateway: this ICMP packet
is processed by the IPsec gateway. As the packet appears to
belong to an active tunnel, the gateway stores the following
PMTU value in its SAD (step 2):
PMTUSAD = max(MTUICMP PTB, 576) = 576
It is important to note that the gateway does not accept a
proposed value smaller than the minimum guaranteed MTU.
At this point, the traffic is not blocked in any way be-
tween the targeted gateway and the remote end of the tunnel.
Nevertheless the throughput is reduced for the IPsec tunnel
and any packet exceeding the PMTUSAD maximum size
must now be fragmented (usually by the end-device as the
DF bit is set).
3) Drop of the first large TCP segment: let us consider an
ssh connection from outside, to a server located in the red
network. The TCP three-way handshake happens normally,
because the associated TCP segment are tiny. However any
further bulk data transfer on this connection is impacted.
This is the case of the 784 + 52 = 836 byte packet (52
bytes for the TCP/IP headers, including TCP options) of
step 3, which exceeds the PMTUSAD value stored in the
SAD.
4) ICMP PTB error message on the trusted network:
therefore the IPsec gateway emits an ICMP PTB packet
(step 4) with the following MTU indication:
MTU = PMTUSAD − sizeencapsulation IP/IPsec/ESP
due to the encapsulation header (whose size depends on
the chosen ciphering algorithm), the gateway restricts the
MTU value to 514 bytes. Looking at Fig. 3, we see that
the 8th packet, containing a 784 byte TCP segment, is
immediately followed by an ICMP error message with that
MTU indication.
5) Deadlock on the red network: upon receiving this
ICMP PTB packet, the device computes the PMTU to use:
PMTU = max(MTUICMP PTB,MTUconfig.) = 552
The 552 value comes from the default Debian configuration
(the Linux kernel itself uses 562 instead) and can be changed
by the device administrator if needed.
Therefore the TCP segments are fragmented (remember
that the device sets the DF bit to be sure that no frag-
mentation appears later on in the network for performance
reasons). Nevertheless, instead of creating 514 byte packets,
as requested by the IPsec gateway, the device generates
500 + 52 = 552 byte packets (step 5). Since it is still too
large, this packet is dropped by the gateway which sends
another ICMP PTB packet.
At this point, no packet emitted by the device for this
TCP connection is forwarded on the IPsec tunnel, and any
data (even a few bytes) submitted by the application later
gets stuck behind. To conclude, the TCP connection is totally
blocked and the DoS attack is successful4.
C. Attack on TCP connections with devices using PLPMTUd
As the DoS attack exploits a maximum segment size
issue, we now experiment with the second path MTU
4After 2 minutes of failures, the ssh server initiates a half-close
(FIN/ACK exchange). The other side of the TCP connection curiously
remains open.
discovery algorithm, PLPMTUd. The attack is illustrated in
Fig. 5 and the corresponding tcpdump traces, collected on
the red network, are shown in Fig. 4.
We show below that the effect of the attack is different:
first it significantly slows down the ssh connection opening,
then it limits the TCP segment size to a value significantly
lower than the minimum MTU size of IPv4 which consumes
more resources and reduces the maximum throughput.
Fig. 5: Our attack on an IPsec gateway, PLPMTUd case
The first two steps that involve the attacker are identical
to the PMTUd case and are not discussed here.
1) Fragments handling by the gateway: due to the
PLPMTUd algorithm that progressively increases the seg-
ment size, the device now fragments the 784 byte ssh
message into two TCP segments of size 500 and 284 bytes
respectively (steps 3 and 3’ of Fig. 5). The 500 byte size
is typically a probing size, chosen by PLPMTUd, in order
to test this small value. The gateway processes each packet,
returning an ICMP PTB packet for the first one (step 4) as
it is too large, and forwarding the second one (step 4’).
2) Large segment and ICMP PTB deadlock: the ICMP
PTB packet is ignored by the PLPMTUd algorithm, this
latter relying only on acknowledgments and delay expira-
tions. In our test, after expiration of the timeout for the
first packet (at time 0.21s), the end-user device sends an
identical 552 byte packet to the gateway (step 5) because
PLPMTUd already used the minimal size allowed by the
host configuration.
The same problem happens 5 times (a total of 5 ICMP
error messages are received).
3) Finally, the segment size is further reduced: 6.59s
after the TCP connection establishment, the PLPMTUd
component decides to drastically reduce the segment size:
instead of a single 500 byte segment, it now sends a 256 byte
TCP segment (step 13) followed by a 244 byte TCP segment.
Being small enough, both of them are forwarded by the
IPsec gateway. The ssh connection finishes after a few
additional segments and a prompt appears in the terminal.
To conclude a huge delay of 6.59s was required before
the first data arrives to the destination. Additionally, any
packet leaving this device after this initial delay contains
at most 256 byte of data, which can drastically reduce the
achieved throughput as well as consuming more resources
in the forwarding nodes.
D. Attack on a bulk UDP flow
Let us now consider a UDP flow, where the application
submits large data chunks (1100 byte) to the UDP socket.
The beginning of the attack is the same. Then the device
sends a 1100 + 28 = 1128 byte IP packet with the DF bit
set to 1 (no fragmentation). The IPsec gateway discards
this packet and returns an ICMP PTB message with the
same 514 byte MTU indication as before. The following
UDP datagram is fragmented into three IP packets of size
548, 548 and 72 bytes respectively. This time the DF bit is
set to 0 in all three packets (fragmentation is authorized),
probably to reduce the risks that these packets be dropped.
At the gateway, it turns out that with encapsulation, the first
two IP packets are again too large (they exceed the PMTU
value of the SAD). Since fragmentation is authorized, they
are once again fragmented into two packets each of size
528 and 60 bytes respectively. At the end, the initial large
UDP datagram is transmitted in the IPsec tunnel in five
medium or tiny IP packets (548, 60, 548, 60 and 112 bytes
respectively), whereas three should have been sufficient with
an appropriate IP fragmentation at the sender, or even a
single one without any attack.
To conclude we see that the attack seriously impacts
UDP flows, by reducing the achieved throughput and con-
suming more resources.
V. COUNTER-MEASURES
A. Problems assessment
Our attack highlights several fundamental issues:
• an IPsec gateway cannot distinguish between le-
gitimate and illegitimate unsecured (i.e. coming
from the black network) ICMP packets. Although
such packets are suspect, they are necessary in
particular because many hosts still rely on the old
PMTUd algorithm;
• when the Path MTU approaches the minimum
packet size each link technology should support
(576 bytes with IPv4), bad interactions can happen
if tunnelling is used. In our case the end-user
device does not accept the Path MTU advertised
by the IPsec gateway because this latter is lower
than the minimum packet size, even after removing
TCP/IP headers. This mistake is also caused by
the fact the end-user device is not aware of the
presence of an IPsec tunnel, that requires some
room in any packet to store the extra IP/IPsec
headers;
• the compliance on the minimum packet size is too
strong when using the traditional PMTUd approach.
On the opposite, PLPMTUd is more flexible since
it finally tries to use a TCP segment size lower
than this minimum packet size. Communications are
feasible, although in a sub-optimal way.
0.000000 a.b.10.7.48063 > a.b.11.5.ssh: S *:*(0) win 17920 <mss 8960,sackOK,timestamp 1572549 0,nop,wscale 7> (DF)
0.000142 a.b.11.5.ssh > a.b.10.7.48063: S *:*(0) ack * win 17896 <mss 8960,sackOK,timestamp 1645937 1572549,nop,wscale 7> (DF)
0.000417 a.b.10.7.48063 > a.b.11.5.ssh: . ack 1 win 140 <nop,nop,timestamp 1572550 1645937> (DF)
0.004208 a.b.11.5.ssh > a.b.10.7.48063: P 1:33(32) ack 1 win 140 <nop,nop,timestamp 1645938 1572550> (DF)
0.004535 a.b.10.7.48063 > a.b.11.5.ssh: . ack 33 win 140 <nop,nop,timestamp 1572551 1645938> (DF)
0.004538 a.b.10.7.48063 > a.b.11.5.ssh: P 1:33(32) ack 33 win 140 <nop,nop,timestamp 1572551 1645938> (DF)
0.004676 a.b.11.5.ssh > a.b.10.7.48063: . ack 33 win 140 <nop,nop,timestamp 1645938 1572551> (DF)
0.004688 a.b.10.7.48063 > a.b.11.5.ssh: . 33:545(512) ack 33 win 140 <nop,nop,timestamp 1572551 1645938> (DF)
0.004711 a.b.11.5.ssh > a.b.10.7.48063: . 33:533(500) ack 33 win 140 <nop,nop,timestamp 1645938 1572551> (DF)
0.004719 a.b.11.4 > a.b.11.5: ICMP ERROR: a.b.10.7 unreachable - need to frag (mtu 514) [tos 0xc0]
0.004721 a.b.11.5.ssh > a.b.10.7.48063: P 533:817(284) ack 33 win 140 <nop,nop,timestamp 1645938 1572551> (DF)
0.004960 a.b.10.7.48063 > a.b.11.5.ssh: P 545:881(336) ack 33 win 140 <nop,nop,timestamp 1572551 1645938> (DF)
0.005006 a.b.10.7.48063 > a.b.11.5.ssh: . ack 33 win 140 <nop,nop,timestamp 1572551 1645938,nop,nop,sack 1 {533:817} > (DF)
0.005046 a.b.11.5.ssh > a.b.10.7.48063: . ack 881 win 156 <nop,nop,timestamp 1645938 1572551> (DF)
0.214634 a.b.11.5.ssh > a.b.10.7.48063: . 33:533(500) ack 881 win 156 <nop,nop,timestamp 1645991 1572551> (DF)
0.214643 a.b.11.4 > a.b.11.5: ICMP ERROR: a.b.10.7 unreachable - need to frag (mtu 514) [tos 0xc0]
0.638636 a.b.11.5.ssh > a.b.10.7.48063: . 33:533(500) ack 881 win 156 <nop,nop,timestamp 1646097 1572551> (DF)
0.638646 a.b.11.4 > a.b.11.5: ICMP ERROR: a.b.10.7 unreachable - need to frag (mtu 514) [tos 0xc0]
1.486639 a.b.11.5.ssh > a.b.10.7.48063: . 33:533(500) ack 881 win 156 <nop,nop,timestamp 1646309 1572551> (DF)
1.486645 a.b.11.4 > a.b.11.5: ICMP ERROR: a.b.10.7 unreachable - need to frag (mtu 514) [tos 0xc0]
3.186646 a.b.11.5.ssh > a.b.10.7.48063: . 33:533(500) ack 881 win 156 <nop,nop,timestamp 1646734 1572551> (DF)
3.186655 a.b.11.4 > a.b.11.5: ICMP ERROR: a.b.10.7 unreachable - need to frag (mtu 514) [tos 0xc0]
6.586634 a.b.11.5.ssh > a.b.10.7.48063: . 33:289(256) ack 881 win 156 <nop,nop,timestamp 1647584 1572551> (DF)
6.586831 a.b.10.7.48063 > a.b.11.5.ssh: . ack 289 win 148 <nop,nop,timestamp 1574196 1647584,nop,nop,sack 1 {533:817} > (DF)
6.586941 a.b.11.5.ssh > a.b.10.7.48063: . 289:533(244) ack 881 win 156 <nop,nop,timestamp 1647584 1574196> (DF)
6.587143 a.b.10.7.48063 > a.b.11.5.ssh: . ack 817 win 156 <nop,nop,timestamp 1574196 1647584> (DF)
6.587147 a.b.10.7.48063 > a.b.11.5.ssh: P 881:905(24) ack 817 win 156 <nop,nop,timestamp 1574196 1647584> (DF)
6.588458 a.b.11.5.ssh > a.b.10.7.48063: P 817:969(152) ack 905 win 156 <nop,nop,timestamp 1647584 1574196> (DF)
6.589189 a.b.10.7.48063 > a.b.11.5.ssh: P 905:1049(144) ack 969 win 164 <nop,nop,timestamp 1574197 1647584> (DF)
6.593662 a.b.11.5.ssh > a.b.10.7.48063: . 969:1225(256) ack 1049 win 164 <nop,nop,timestamp 1647585 1574197> (DF)
6.593739 a.b.11.5.ssh > a.b.10.7.48063: . 1225:1481(256) ack 1049 win 164 <nop,nop,timestamp 1647585 1574197> (DF)
6.593750 a.b.11.5.ssh > a.b.10.7.48063: P 1481:1689(208) ack 1049 win 164 <nop,nop,timestamp 1647585 1574197> (DF)
6.593946 a.b.10.7.48063 > a.b.11.5.ssh: . ack 1481 win 176 <nop,nop,timestamp 1574198 1647585> (DF)
Fig. 4: tcpdump trace on the red network during the attack, PLPMTUd case. Notations are consistent with Fig. 3
In the following sections we first discuss how to mitigate
our attack, the we present an IPsec Path MTU evaluation
mechanism.
B. Mitigation of the attack at the end-user device
In our testbed, the overhead of the new headers (outer
IP, IPsec, ESP) is 38 bytes, so the end-user device must
send at most 576 − 38 = 538 byte long packets for them
to go through the tunnel. Knowing that, the end-user can
decrease the minimal value used by PMTUd or PLPMTUd
algorithms to match the target IP packet size (which has
little impact if no attack occurs). TABLE II summarizes the
effect of the attack, observed in our experimental testbed,
according to this configuration.
Algorithm Minimum size Attack effect
PMTUd 538 or less throughput reduction
PMTUd 539 or more DoS
PLPMTUd 486 or less throughput reduction
PLPMTUd 487 or more severe throughput reduction (256 byte packets)
TABLE II: ICMP PTB attack effects depending of the end–
user device configuration.
We see that a correct configuration at the end-user device
can mitigate the attack. However it has the main drawback of
requiring the end-user to be perfectly aware of the presence
of a tunnel and the encapsulation headers sizes that depend
on the exact IPsec mode and cipher algorithm used.
C. IPsec gateway Path MTU discovery
Another approach is to let IPsec gateways assess the
MTU along the path between them, without relying on ICMP
PTB messages that are not reliable.
More precisely we propose to add in the gateway a
probing mechanism like PLPMTUd to evaluate the PMTU
on the black network. This probing mechanism must be
coupled with an acknowledgment and timeout system to
determine whether the probing packet found its way to the
remote gateway. The PMTU is then stored in the SAD.
There are performance penalties with this mechanism,
in particular because it generates additional packets on the
black network (probes are ad-hoc packets, whereas PLPM-
TUd in TCP reuses application data in the probing packets).
This mechanism is also less responsive to a PMTU change
in the black network (e.g. caused by a route change) due to
its use of timeouts. However we believe it’s a good solution
that prevents the attack we described5.
VI. RELATED WORK
IPsec has attracted the attention of the security and
cryptography communities.Some works describe attacks re-
lated to the misuse of cryptographic primitives in IPsec.
The team of Paterson [19], [20] has discovered several
weaknesses related to an incorrect usage of encryption.
[21], [22] focuses on DoS attacks against the ”encryption
5This approach is still fragile in case of an attacker that can identify
probes and selectively drop them. However this is an additional capability
for the attacker that is not considered in our attack and that is not necessarily
trivial to achieve.
only” configuration of IPsec. These works are based on the
possibility of a forgery attack on the Initialization Value to
change an inner header field. Our work follows a purely
network approach to uncover weaknesses.
ICMP has been used for DoS and distributed DoS attacks
for a long time (ping flood is detailed in every network se-
curity textbooks [23]). DoS attacks such as Smurf attack [24]
and Tribe Flood Network attack [25] are respectively based
on ICMP ”Echo Request” using a spoofed IP source (the
victim) plus a broadcast IP destination, and ICMP ”Echo
Reply” plus a botnet. Both attacks aim to flood the target
with ICMP messages. Many implementations of ICMP do
not handle correctly packets larger than the maximal value
recommended by the RFCs. These oversized ICMP pack-
ets, well–known as ”Ping of Death”, can disable an host.
Otherwise flooding the victim with ”Echo Request/Reply”
messages has long been considered. But this is also easily
avoided with appropriate filtering rules on the IPsec gate-
way. So we see that our work totally departs from these
”traditional” techniques.
[3], [26] that describe PMTUd acknowledge the exis-
tence of threats related to the use of ICMP PTB mes-
sages. (e.g. for blind throughput–reduction attack against
TCP [16]). [10] details for the various ICMP (type,code)
messages the associated threats and filtering advices to
mitigate them. Our work goes more deeply in this direction
and introduces a new threat with ICMP PTB messages.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this work we have shown that beyond the traditional
DoS attacks, ICMP is also an attack vector against IPsec
gateways for an attacker having eavesdropping and traffic
injection capabilities in the black untrusted network, without
any access to clear-text (he only sees ciphered packets).
We demonstrated this attack in a Debian–based testbed and
showed its efficiency to create DoS or major performance
penalties, both with TCP and UDP flows.
We also discussed the fundamental problems and pro-
posed countermeasures. In particular, within the IPsec
gateways, we proposed to use PLPMTUd to probe the
network and assess the various Path MTUs.
Future works will enlarge the scope of this study by
considering other Operating Systems and IPv6. We will also
experiment with our proposed gateway-level PLPMTUd to
assess its efficiency.
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